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I.  INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA) in 1972 with the express objective
of restoring and maintaining the health of the nation’s waters.  To achieve this
objective, Congress declared that discharges of pollutants into the nation’s waters are
prohibited unless they comply with permit requirements.  The CWA’s primary vehicle
for regulating discharge permits is the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System, or NPDES.
The CWA defines the phrase “discharge of a pollutant” as the “addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”1  Although the CWA further
defines the terms “pollutant,” “navigable waters,” and “point source,” it fails to provide
a definition for the term “addition.”2  As a result, courts have struggled to delineate the
circumstances under which an “addition” occurs under the Act.  In particular, courts
have wrestled with whether a transfer of polluted water from one distinct water body
into another distinct water body, referred to as an “interbasin transfer,” is an “addition”
that requires a NPDES permit.  In Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc.
v. City of New York,3 the Second Circuit held that such transfers are “additions,” and
distinguished them from “intrabasin transfers,” or transfers that occur within a single
water body, which the court stated did not require NPDES permits.4  Subsequently, in
strong dicta, the Supreme Court in South Florida Water Management District v.
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians5 suggested that it agreed with the Second Circuit’s
framework for distinguishing “additions” based on the extent to which the water bodies
involved in a water transfer are distinct.6
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Miccosukee, the EPA announced plans
to amend its CWA regulations to categorically exclude water transfers from the
NPDES permitting program,7 and, in June 2006, it published a proposed rule having
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8. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Water Transfer Proposed Rule, 71 Fed.
Reg. 32,887 (proposed June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122) [hereinafter NPDES Proposed
Rule].
9. Id. at 32,890-91.
10. Id. at 32,891.
that effect.8  Contrary to the rationale in Catskill and Miccosukee, the EPA’s proposed
water transfer rule does not distinguish between interbasin and intrabasin water
transfers.  Rather, the EPA claims that several provisions in the CWA indicate that the
regulation of water transfers falls under the authority of the states to manage water
allocations.9  Because the NPDES program would interfere with the authority of states
to allocate quantities of water, the EPA concluded that water transfers are expressly
excluded from NPDES requirements.10
Agency nonacquiescence is the refusal by administrative agencies to follow the
decisions of lower federal courts.  Nonacquiescence takes two forms: intercircuit
nonacquiescence and intracircuit nonacquiescence.  Intercircuit nonacquiescence
occurs when an agency refuses to apply the law of one circuit in proceedings taking
place in another circuit.  In contrast, intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an
agency refuses to adjust its policies within a circuit after an adverse ruling by that
circuit.  Generally, agencies argue that nonacquiescence is necessary to ensure the
uniform administration of agency regulations and the development of law that takes
place through intercircuit dialogue.  However, nonacquiescence also implicates grave
separation of powers concerns, and it is questionable whether the presumed benefits
of uniformity and intercircuit dialogue outweigh the harms that nonacquiescence
presents to the judiciary and the development of administrative law.
The purpose of this Note is to evaluate the EPA’s proposed water transfer rule in
the context of agency nonacquiescence.  This Note begins with a discussion of agency
nonacquiescence and explores the differences between its two varieties, intercircuit and
intracircuit nonacquiescence.  In particular, this Note focuses on the primary justifica-
tions for, and arguments against, the use of the doctrine.  It then discusses the evolution
of the EPA’s proposed water transfer rule.  The discussion begins with an overview of
relevant CWA provisions, turns to a review of the precedent that has explored the
meaning of the term “addition,” and concludes with an analysis of the proposed rule.
Next, this Note moves to an analysis of the Catskill litigation and the Second Circuit’s
decisions in 2001 and 2006.  
Finally, this Note evaluates whether the EPA’s proposed water transfer rule repre-
sents a form of nonacquiescence in light of the Catskill and Miccosukee decisions.
Concluding that it is, this Note argues that the EPA’s proposed rule rejects the
distinction between interbasin and intrabasin transfers that several courts have carefully
articulated, and rejects the importance of that distinction in determining whether an
“addition” is subject to NPDES permit requirements.  Furthermore, this Note con-
cludes that the EPA’s proposed rule dramatically alters the view of cooperative
federalism that several courts have attributed to the CWA.  Because the EPA’s nonac-
quiescence does not create any benefit by encouraging uniformity or intercircuit
dialogue, this Note argues that the EPA is not justified in proposing a rule that conflicts
with the considered judgments of several courts.  The EPA’s nonacquiescence is
particularly unwarranted because, unlike the majority of regulations that are issued in
176 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1
11. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
12. See Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 887 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The inferior courts have a clear
responsibility to refine the basic constitutional principles enunciated by the Supreme Court. The task is
accomplished through the process of reasoned elaboration disciplined by the doctrines of stare decisis and
precedent. The duty ‘to say what the law is’ is a unitary one within the unitary judicial department created
by the Constitution.”); Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Instead of
reappraising determinations that have been endorsed by our sister circuits, we must reaffirm certain
fundamental tenets of the doctrine of stare decisis and thus reassert the power of the federal judiciary to
interpret statutes enacted by Congress.”).
13. It is generally true that administrative agencies feel compelled to follow Supreme Court precedents,
but “there exists a genuine controversy as to whether or not those agencies must follow the precedents of
the lower federal courts that review their decisions.”  Steven P. Eichel, “Respectful Disagreement”:
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies in United States Courts of Appeals Precedents, 18
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 463, 464 (1983).  
14. See William Wade Buzbee, Note, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985); Dan T. Coenen, The Constitutional Case Against Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1339 (1991); Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE
L.J. 801 (1990); Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) [hereinafter Estreicher, Nonacquiescence]; Samuel Estreicher &
Richard L. Revesz, The Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 99 YALE L.J. 831 (1990)
[hereinafter Estreicher, The Uneasy Case]; Samuel Figler, Executive Agency Nonacquiescence to Judicial
Opinions, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1664 (1993); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994).  Many of these commentators also
identify a third category, nonacquiescence in the face of venue choice, but this is not discussed in this Note.
15. Figler, supra note 14, at 1667; see also Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 687.
16. Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Adjudication, 39 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1207 (1992).
the absence of judicial commentary, the EPA has chosen to propose a rule based on a
rationale that has been previously criticized by several circuits.
II.  ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY NONACQUIESCENCE 
A.  Introduction to Nonacquiescence
A fundamental precept in American law familiar to even the most novice student
is the power of the judiciary “to say what the law is.”11  This principle, in turn,
establishes one of the primary rationales for the doctrine of stare decisis.12  Although
courts regularly adhere to the principle of stare decisis without question, its application
has caused a good deal of consternation in the “quasi-judicial” realm of administrative
law.  This consternation results from one situation in particular: agency refusal to
follow lower federal court decisions, or agency nonacquiescence.13
Commentators generally differentiate between two forms of nonacquiescence:
intercircuit and intracircuit.14  Intercircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency
refuses to apply the law of one circuit in proceedings taking place in another circuit.15
In contrast, intracircuit nonacquiescence occurs when an agency refuses to adjust its
policies within a circuit after an adverse ruling by that circuit.16  Commentators
distinguish between these two forms of nonacquiescence because each form carries
constitutional burdens of varying weight; indeed, many commentators argue that it is
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17. Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 719.   For example, Estreicher and Revesz argue
that intercircuit nonacquiescence by definition does not offend the Constitution because there is no
constitutional requirement for intercircuit stare decisis; therefore, “in pursuing a policy of intercircuit
nonacquiescence, by definition the agency is not acting inconsistently with the case law of the court of
appeals that will review its action, and that court is under no obligation to follow the ruling of the circuit
that previously rejected the agency’s position.”  Id.
18. See Coenen, supra note 14; Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14; Figler, supra note 14.
To a large extent, regardless of constitutionality, the debate on nonacquiescence centers on whether it is
justified, given the harms and benefits of nonacquiescence and the goals of administrative law.  Estreicher
and Revesz, for example, exert a considerable effort in evaluating “the policy considerations implicated by
[intracircuit and intercircuit] nonacquiescence” and conclude that intercircuit nonacquiescence should not
be limited because the limitations would not “advance the proper functioning of the administrative
lawmaking system.”  Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 735.  On the other hand, Diller and
Morawetz respond to the Estreicher and Revesz thesis by advancing a different balancing of
nonacquiescence harms and benefits, leading them to the conclusion that “[the Estreicher and Revesz]
proposal upsets the balance between agencies and courts by rendering the judiciary essentially powerless
to enforce congressional limitations on agency conduct.”  Diller & Morawetz, supra note 14, at 803.
19. Eichel, supra note 13, at 464.
20. Id.
21. Newsweek, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 663 F.2d 1186, 1196 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[I]t is well settled that
the decisions of one Circuit Court of Appeals are not binding upon another Circuit.”); United States v.
Carney, 387 F.3d 436, 444 n.7 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit is not bound by stare decisis to adhere
to the prior ruling of any sister circuit . . . .”); see Newmark v. Principi, 283 F.3d 172, 174 (3d Cir. 2002)
(“Because decisions made in other jurisdictions are not binding on us, we will examine and interpret the
statute ourselves in the light of our precedent.”).
22. PNC Bank Del. v. F/V Miss Laura, 381 F.3d 183, 186 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We . . . are mindful of our
obligation to avoid circuit conflict.”); United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir.
1987) (“[A]bsent a strong reason to do so, we will not create a direct conflict with other circuits.”).
23. Wash. Energy Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“[The federal appellate
court] regime, by design, embraces the possibility of a considered difference in views among the circuit
courts on a given question . . . .”); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171, 1176
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“The federal courts spread across the country owe respect to each other’s efforts and
should strive to avoid conflicts, but each has an obligation to engage independently in reasoned analysis.”).
24. Eichel, supra note 13, at 467.
only intracircuit nonacquiescence that presents serious constitutional concerns.17
However, an evaluation of the harms and benefits of nonacquiescence in the context
of the purposes of the administrative lawmaking system generally reveal that both
categories exact a cost.18
Agencies often justify nonacquiescence by pointing out that they are responsible
for administering nationally uniform regulations.19  Because the lower federal courts
have limited geographic jurisdiction, agencies argue that an obligation to follow any
one circuit inevitably harms an agency’s ability to administer its nationally applicable
regulations.20  The limited geographic reach of the courts of appeals results in a “law
of the circuit” in which courts within a circuit are bound by that circuit’s precedent, but
not the precedent from sister circuits.21  Although courts of appeals do not lightly
create conflict with other circuits,22 occasional circuit conflict is an inherent attribute
of the federal judicial system.23  Agencies thus argue that national uniformity in the
administration of regulations can only be achieved when a challenged regulation
“percolates” up to the Supreme Court.24  Any resultant compromise in uniformity
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25. Id.
26. 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
27. See Buzbee, supra note 14, at 590-91.  Traditional collateral estoppel allows a defendant to prevent
a plaintiff from re-litigating an issue decided against the plaintiff in a subsequent suit between the two
parties.  In contrast, the principle of non-mutual collateral estoppel enables a defendant to prevent a plaintiff
from re-litigating an issue that the plaintiff previously lost in a proceeding involving an entirely different
defendant.  In practice, non-mutual collateral estoppel can be invoked by either plaintiffs or defendants.
The key case authorizing the use of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel by federal courts is Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
28. Mendoza, 464 U.S. at 160.
29. See Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 684.
30. Estreicher and Revesz claim that “Mendoza’s rejection of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the
government, however, does not compel any particular answer to the nonacquiescence controversy.” Id. at
685 (footnote omitted).  Yet the relevance of Mendoza is arguably dependent on the category of
nonacquiescence, that is, whether an agency is defending its use of intercircuit nonacquiescence or
intracircuit nonacquiescence. See discussion infra Part II.B.
31. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
32. Buzbee, supra note 14, at 592.
33. Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 685.
34. See Coenen, supra note 14; Figler, supra note 14.
35. Coenen, supra note 14, at 1352.
among the circuits, they argue, is counterbalanced by a “well-reasoned development
of the law.”25
Proponents of nonacquiescence also point to United States v. Mendoza,26 which
established the inapplicability of nonmutual collateral estoppel against the
government.27  In Mendoza, the Supreme Court reasoned that allowing nonmutual
collateral estoppel against the government would prematurely freeze dialogue on a
legal issue and “deprive this Court of the benefit it receives from permitting several
courts of appeals to explore a difficult question before this Court grants certiorari.”28
By analogy, then, proponents of nonacquiescence argue that an obligation to follow a
lower federal circuit court opinion would impose the same restrictions on the agency
as nonmutual collateral estoppel would impose on the government.29
However, the extent to which Mendoza legitimizes nonacquiescence is
questionable.30  Mendoza dealt specifically with the doctrine of nonmutual collateral
estoppel, which is not directly related to stare decisis.31  The latter doctrine is arguably
more narrow in that it only creates binding precedent within a jurisdiction, whereas the
former doctrine would allow a decision in any court in any jurisdiction to estop an
agency from further litigation.32  Thus, some commentators have concluded that, as “a
logical matter, the fact that the government may not be precluded in court from
relitigating issues that it lost in prior cases does not imply that it may disregard rulings
of the courts of appeals.”33
The relevance of Mendoza aside, a more significant argument against
nonacquiescence is the extent to which it is appropriate within the framework of the
Constitution.34  First, nonacquiescence presents Fifth Amendment equal protection
concerns because of the doctrine’s potential to treat rich and poor plaintiffs
differently.35  The inequity arguably occurs because only wealthy plaintiffs will be able
to seek judicial review of an agency decision and procure a favorable application of
circuit law.  This differential treatment of plaintiffs violates the right of all citizens to
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36. Id. at 1352-54.
37. Id. at 1355.
38. Id. at 1357-58.
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
40. Coenen, supra note 14, at 1358-59.  Cases cited by Coenen and other commentators include
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958), and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
41. Coenen, supra note 14, at 1347.
42. E.g., Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 735-36.
43. See Bruff, supra note 16, at 1207 (“Mendoza implies the legitimacy of intercircuit nonac-
quiescence, under which a loss in one circuit does not cause an agency to change its internal policy while
it attempts to relitigate the issue elsewhere.”); Figler, supra note 14, at 1670.
44. Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 739. The ratchet would work against the agency
in that “the authoritative voice would be that of the first court of appeals to rule against the agency.”  Id.
Estreicher and Revesz illustrate this scenario with a hypothetical built on United States v. Stauffer Chemical
Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984), which involved the EPA’s use of independent contractors in Clean Air Act
enforcement proceedings:
If the first court of appeals to face this question determined that EPA could not use
independent contractors, a bar against intercircuit non-acquiescence would prevent the
agency from using such contractors anywhere in the country. In addition, it is unlikely that
any private party would have standing to argue that the agency should be given the option
of using such contractors. Thus, no subsequent court would have the opportunity to decide
whether independent contractors are part of the permissible arsenal of enforcement options.
As a practical matter, and contrary to the systemic judgment underlying the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Mendoza, the adverse ruling of the court of appeals would therefore
become binding and no further dialogue among the circuits would be possible.
Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 737-38.
meaningful access to controlling law.36  Similarly, nonacquiescence arguably violates
Fifth Amendment procedural due process rights because it increases the likelihood that
plaintiffs will be deprived of the benefit of controlling law.37
Second, nonacquiescence directly conflicts with the theory of separation of
powers.38  The foundation of the argument against nonacquiescence stems from Chief
Justice John Marshall’s famous proclamation in Marbury that it “is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”39  The argument
finds further support in several Supreme Court cases that have affirmed judicial
supremacy in the context of executive challenges to the judiciary.40  For commentators
critical of nonacquiescence, the argument leads to the conclusion that “[n]o sufficiently
powerful interest justifies the serious affront to the judicial power posed by executive
flouting of the considered pronouncements of a supervisory circuit court.”41   
B.  Intercircuit Agency Nonacquiescence
Because intercircuit stare decisis does not exist, some commentators argue that
there should be no constraint on an agency’s refusal to acquiesce to a circuit court
decision when the agency is not operating within that circuit’s jurisdiction.42  As a
result, the rationale of Mendoza is most applicable in the context of intercircuit
nonacquiescence.43  For example, if an agency were forced to adjust its policies
according to the first court of appeals decision that ruled against it on an issue, then not
only would the agency be deprived of the subsequent percolation of the issue in other
circuits, but there would be a “one-way ratchet” working against the agency.44  More
important, even if several circuits had previously ruled favorably for an agency, the
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45. Id. at 738.
46. Id. at 736.
47. Id. at 736-37.
48. Id. at 739 (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 202, 209 (1947); Chevron U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984)).
49. Figler, supra note 14, at 1672.
50. Coenen, supra note 14, at 1414 (citing the Supreme Court’s recognition in Heckler v. Day, 467
U.S. 104, 116 (1984), of “Congress’ oft-repeated goal of uniform administration of the [Social Security]
Act”).
51. Figler, supra note 14, at 1672.
52. Id.
53. See Coenen, supra note 14; Diller & Morawetz, supra note 14.
54. See Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 743-48; Coenen, supra note 14, at 1414-31.
agency would be required to adjust its policy according to the first court of appeals to
issue an unfavorable ruling.45
In contrast, the absence of a bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence arguably
contributes to the development of intercircuit dialogue.46  There are several presumed
benefits rising from intercircuit dialogue: first, the refinement of legal issues through
“doctrinal dialogue” can occur only when courts of appeals address one another’s legal
reasoning; second, “experiential dialogue” enables circuit courts to evaluate each other
and the “consequences of different legal rules”; third, conflicts in intercircuit dialogue
help the Supreme Court identify relevant cases and issues for certiorari; and fourth,
doctrinal and experiential dialogue ultimately enables the Supreme Court to evaluate
the merits of the cases it reviews.47  Additionally, intercircuit dialogue arguably
preserves the role of the agency as the primary delegate of congressional authority.  In
fact, some commentators argue that allowing the first court of appeals to determine the
scope of agency policies runs contrary to the holdings of several foundational cases
vesting primary policymaking powers in agencies, not courts.48
That is not to say that intercircuit nonacquiescence does not exact any harm on the
administrative law system.  The legal principle harmed the most from intercircuit
nonacquiescence is the uniform application of regulatory law.49  In establishing the
administrative legal system, Congress intended that each agency would administer
programs uniformly throughout the United States.50  However, when agencies ignore
circuit court rulings, uniformity is inevitably compromised because an agency may
continue to enforce policies and practices in some jurisdictions, despite the fact that
those same policies and practices are unenforceable in other jurisdictions.51  Therefore,
given the congressional intent to create uniform regulatory law, intercircuit
nonacquiescence flouts a primary goal of the administrative system.52
C.  Intracircuit Agency Nonacquiescence
  Many commentators believe that in terms of constitutional violations, intracircuit
nonacquiescence presents a greater risk to the government’s separation of powers than
intercircuit nonacquiescence.53  However, weighing the harms and benefits of
intracircuit nonacquiescence is not altogether different from weighing the harms and
benefits of intercircuit nonacquiescence and focuses to a significant extent on the same
principles of intercircuit dialogue and uniformity.54  
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55. Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 743.
56. Id. at 743-44.  “Thus, a total bar against intracircuit nonacquiescence would make it impossible for
a circuit that at one time ruled against the agency to continue a dialogue with circuits that subsequently
ruled for the agency.”  Id. at 744.
57. Id.
58. Id. 
59. Id.  Estreicher and Revesz suggest that prohibiting intracircuit nonacquiescence would require the
Supreme Court to intervene more often than it should, meaning that “conflicts could be harmonized without
intervention by the Supreme Court only if the courts of appeals that ruled for the agency reconsidered their
position.” Id.
60. Id. at 747.  Estreicher and Revesz illustrate this scenario by describing the effects of a court’s
decision on the EPA’s ambient air pollution standards: 
If one circuit were to strike down regulations limiting the permissible emissions of a
particular pollutant, the effects would be felt not only in that circuit, but in downwind
circuits as well.  For the ambient standards to be met in those circuits, the agency would
have to define more stringent circuit-specific emission standards for those downwind states.
Id.
61. Id. at 748.
62. Id.  Horizontal uniformity refers to the “equal treatment of regulatees or claimants regardless of
where in this country the dispute or claim arose.”  Id.
63. Coenen, supra note 14, at 1413-14.
Unlike a bar against intercircuit nonacquiescence, a prohibition on intracircuit
nonacquiescence would not prematurely freeze dialogue and impede the development
of agency law.  If an agency were to lose a case in one circuit, the agency could still
advocate for favorable rulings and develop case law in other jurisdictions; if the agency
were successful in its endeavors and the litigated issue eventually obtained certiorari,
then the Supreme Court would have the advantage of reviewing the circuits’ varying
treatment of the law.55  However, some commentators argue that a bar against
intracircuit nonacquiescence would still hamper the development of dialogue,
especially where it would prevent a jurisdiction from reconsidering a prior decision in
light of differing treatment in another jurisdiction.56  Additionally, like a bar against
intercircuit nonacquiescence, prohibiting intracircuit nonacquiescence could potentially
produce a similar “one-way ratchet” against agency action because only circuits that
ruled favorably for an agency would be open for reconsideration.57  Again,
commentators argue, the result is one that conflicts with traditional norms of agency
deference and respect for agency policymaking.58  
In terms of uniformity, commentators suggest that a bar against intracircuit
nonacquiescence would likely inhibit the harmonization of federal law.59  The lack of
uniformity could be felt in at least three ways.  First, if a circuit ruled against an
agency, that circuit’s ruling could create economic “externalities” in neighboring
circuits.60  Second, lack of uniformity might encourage forum shopping, a result
antithetical to the purposes of federal regulation.61  Third, a bar against intracircuit
nonacquiescence could create problems of fairness among beneficiaries of federal law
because agencies would not be able to achieve “horizontal” uniformity.62
Contrary to the arguments in favor of intracircuit nonacquiescence, the argument
against it assumes that the interests in pure circuit dialogue and uniformity do not
justify the harms to the judiciary and the law that nonacquiescence produces.63
According to some commentators, the justification is lacking because agencies
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64. Id. at 1414-32. 
65. Id. at 1429.
66. Id. at 1414-15 (“For example, complaints of nonuniformity have something of a hollow ring
because the agencies themselves can cure most problems of nonuniformity by promptly seeking Supreme
Court review and a resulting clarification of national law.”).
67. Id. at 1415.  Coenen, in responding to Estreicher and Revesz’s concern with externalities, argues
that “[t]he best response to this observation is:  So what?  The ‘externalities’ problem . . . exists not because
of the unavailability of intracircuit nonacquiescence, but because Congress has created a system of
geographically defined circuit courts.”  Id. at 1417.  Coenen argues that similar defenses of
nonacquiescence based on intercircuit competition and fairness are “fantasy,” id. at 1418, and
“makeweight,” id. at 1420-21. 
68. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 14, at 812-13 (arguing that the “suggested benefits disappear when
one recognizes that stare decisis plays a central role in maintaining the stability of law within the circuits”).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 813.
71. Id. at 818 (“The respect for agency interpretation of statutes . . . does not address the question posed
by nonacquiescence – namely the agency’s authority to limit the effect of judicial decisions finding that the
agency acted in violation of congressional intent.”).  Coenen also argues that defending nonacquiescence
based on deference to agency expertise is unfair. Coenen, supra note 14, at 1432 (“[W]hen an agency
invokes its expertise to nonacquiesce in an earlier decision invalidating an agency rule, it is seeking a
second bite at the Chevron apple.”).  
72. Diller & Morawetz, supra note 14, at 829.
generally can seek alternate remedies to adverse rulings that do not involve ignoring
circuit case law.64  For example, an agency could still develop circuit dialogue by filing
declaratory judgment actions or seeking “reconsideration of a disfavored circuit court
precedent whenever occasions arise for testing the scope and limits of that
precedent.”65  Agencies also have avenues for seeking uniformity other than
nonacquiescence.  In particular, agencies are often able to relieve a lack of uniformity
by obtaining timely Supreme Court review.66  Commentators also balk at the use of
uniformity to defend nonacquiescence because some degree of nonuniformity inheres
in the design of the federal circuit court system.67
In addition, because of the operation of stare decisis within a circuit, it is
questionable whether intracircuit nonacquiescence could achieve the benefits of circuit
dialogue and uniformity in the first instance.68  First, the argument that full
“percolation” can occur only if circuits freely reconsider previous decisions ignores
“circuit court rules designed to achieve stability of precedent.”69  Second, the
assumption that nonacquiescence promotes uniformity is flawed because “[o]nly in
exceptional circumstances where the circuit will depart from its past precedent is there
any possibility that intracircuit nonacquiescence will advance intercircuit uniformity.”70
Finally, in responding to the assumed infringement on agency deference that a bar
to nonacquiescence presents, commentators argue that questions of respect for agency
policy decisions are entirely separate from the nonacquiescence inquiry.71   Thus, given
the lack of perceived benefits from nonacquiescence, some commentators conclude
that a proper balancing of nonacquiescence and the goals of administrative law simply
does not justify the harm to the federal design of reliance on circuit court rulings.72
Indeed, even those commentators who perceive no threat from intracircuit
nonacquiescence are careful to note that it is “justified only as an interim measure that
allows the agency to maintain a uniform administration of its governing statute at the
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73. Estreicher, Nonacquiescence, supra note 14, at 683.
74. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
75. Id. § 1311(a).  Section 301(a) is often referred to as the “jurisdictional trigger” for both the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program under section 402, id. § 1342, and the dredge
and fill program under section 404, id. § 1344.
76. Id. § 1342.
77. Id. § 1362(12).
78. Id. § 1362(14).
79. See CRAIG N. JOHNSTON, WILLIAM F. FUNK & VICTOR B. FLATT, LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT 150 (2005).  The CWA is based on the principle of “cooperative federalism,” which gives
states significant authority in implementing Federal standards.  Id. (noting that Congress declined to give
the EPA complete authority in administering the CWA and instead chose to “give the States the option of
staying involved in significant ways”).  Most important, section 402(b) allows a state to assume primary
responsibility for the management of the state’s NPDES program.  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).  Additionally,
section 303 reserves to a state the authority to establish water quality standards within that State.  Id.
§ 1313.
80. Id. § 1251(b).
81. Id. § 1251(g).
agency level, and only while federal law on the subject remains in flux and the agency
is making reasonable attempts to persuade the courts to validate its position.”73 
III.  THE BACKGROUND OF EPA’S WATER TRANSFER RULE
A.  Relevant Clean Water Act Provisions
Congress enacted the CWA in 1972.  The first words of the statute, which declare
the Act’s goals and policies, make clear that Congress aspired to achieve an
environmental ideal.  Thus, section 101(a) states that it is the objective of the CWA “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.”74  To achieve this objective, section 301(a) prohibits “the discharge of any
pollutant by any person”75 unless it complies with certain provisions of the Act.  The
primary provision governing discharges is section 402, which establishes the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).76  Furthermore, section 502(12)
defines the term “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.”77  Although “point source” is further defined
in section 502(14) as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance [such as a]
channel, tunnel, [or] conduit . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged,”78
the CWA does not provide a definition for the term “addition.”  As discussed below,
this critical definitional absence has led to a substantial amount of litigation.
Although section 101(a) voices Congress’s desire for environmental standards on
a national scale, Congress also envisioned a substantial role for the states in
implementing those standards.79  Thus, section 101(b) states that “[i]t is the policy of
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution.”80  Similarly, section 101(g)
expressly provides that “the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water
within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired.”81
Finally, section 510(2) states that, except as expressly provided elsewhere in the CWA,
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82. Id. § 1370.
83. For example, section 303(d)(1)(C) requires states to establish “total maximum daily load[s]”
(TMDL) for water bodies where section 402 effluent limitations “are not stringent enough to implement any
water quality standard applicable to such waters.”  Id. § 1313(d)(1)(A), (C).  The EPA has captured
nonpoint pollution by defining TMDL as including both “wasteload allocations” from point sources and
“load allocations” from nonpoint sources.  40 C.F.R. § 130.2 (2006).  Additionally, section 208 requires
states to identify “those areas which, as a result of urban-industrial concentrations or other factors, have
substantial water quality control problems,” and “to control to the extent feasible such sources.”  33 U.S.C.
§ 1288(a)(1), (b)(2)(F)(ii).  Finally, section 319 requires states to identify waters that are polluted from
nonpoint sources and develop a “management program for controlling pollution added from nonpoint
sources.”  Id. § 1329(b)(1). 
84. Id. § 1314(f)(2)(F).
85. Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 227 (1999).
86. Id. at 228 (“For waters impaired by both point and nonpoint source pollution, this lack of precision
in the nonpoint source program adds significant uncertainty to water quality-based controls for point
sources as well.”).
87. 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
88. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
89. 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).
90. Catskill I, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Catskill II, 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 1373 (2007).
91. 280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002), vacated, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
“nothing in [the Act] shall . . . be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any
right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the waters . . . of such States.”82
The CWA uses the section 402 NPDES program as the primary method of dealing
with pollution from point sources.  Nonpoint pollution, however, is not controlled by
a single program, and is instead tackled through a number of provisions.83  One such
provision, section 304(f), requires the EPA Administrator to issue guidelines for
identifying and controlling nonpoint pollution resulting from “changes in the
movement, flow, or circulation of any navigable waters . . . caused by the construction
of dams, levees, channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.”84  Yet unlike the
section 402 NPDES program, the CWA’s nonpoint pollution provisions “do not
require the states or EPA to impose pollution controls tied precisely to [water quality
standards].”85  As a result, the extent to which these provisions reflect a concerted
effort to control nonpoint pollution is questionable.86 
B.  Precedent Exploring the Meaning of “Addition”
Although the CWA does not provide a definition for the term “addition,” several
key cases have explored the circumstances under which a flow of water between water
bodies can constitute an “addition” under the CWA.  Generally, these cases fall into
two categories.  The first category, the “dams cases,” includes National Wildlife
Federation v. Gorsuch87 and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co..88
The second category, the “pumping cases,” includes Dubois v. United States
Department of Agriculture,89 the Catskill decisions that are the focus of this Note,90 and
the Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court decisions in South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians.91  Only in the latter category
have courts found that an “addition” can occur, primarily because “pumping cases”
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92. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 161.  The alleged water quality changes included low dissolved oxygen, high
concentrations of dissolved minerals and nutrients, temperature changes, sediment, and supersaturation.
Id. at 161-64.
93. Id. at 164-65.
94. Id. at 165.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 183.
97. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 581 (6th Cir. 1988).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 582.
100. Id. at 581.
101. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
involve the movement of polluted water from one water body into another entirely
distinct water body, unlike “dams cases,” where the movement of polluted water occurs
within a substantially singular water body.
For example, in Gorsuch, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) sued the EPA
seeking a declaration that water quality changes resulting from impounded dam water92
must be regulated by discharge permits under the NPDES program.93  The EPA
conceded that dams affected water quality in the manner alleged by the NWF, but
argued that in order for an addition of a pollutant to occur, a “point source must
introduce the pollutant into navigable water from the outside world.”94  Because “dam-
caused pollution . . . merely passes through the dam from one body of navigable water
(the reservoir) into another (the downstream river),” the EPA argued that water
released from dams was outside the scope of the NPDES program.95  Giving deference
to the EPA’s interpretation, the D.C. Circuit agreed with the EPA, but stressed the
“narrowness of our decision” and held “merely that EPA’s interpretation is
reasonable.”96
Similarly, Consumers Power involved a suit initiated by the NWF to prohibit a
hydro-electric facility from discharging dead fish and fish remains that resulted from
the operation of the facility’s turbines.97  The facility, “one of the largest pumped
storage facilities in the world,” generated electricity by pumping water from Lake
Michigan into a reservoir and then releasing the water back into the lake through a
system of turbines.98  In addition to generating electricity, the pumping process
destroyed a significant number of fish and then released their remains back into Lake
Michigan.99   Relying on Gorsuch, the court noted that although the fish remains were
“pollutants,” the “movement of pollutants already in the water [was] not an ‘addition’
of pollutants to navigable waters of the United States.”100
The Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts also looked to sections 101(g) and
304(f)(2)(F) to determine the scope of an “addition” and the extent to which Congress
intended the movement of water to be regulated by the CWA.  Neither court, however,
found that those sections spoke to the issue in any definitive manner.  For example, the
Gorsuch court noted that, regarding section 101(g), “[i]n light of its intent to minimize
federal control over state decisions on water quantity, Congress might also, if
confronted with the issue, have decided to leave control of dams insofar as they affect
water quality to the states.”101  However, the court noted the conditional nature of this
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102. Id. at 179 n.67 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 39,212 (1977)).
103. Consumers Power, 862 F.2d at 588.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 177).
106. Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).  The river at issue was the
Pemigewasset River, which was “for years one of the most polluted rivers in New England, the repository
for raw sewage from factories and towns.” Id. at 1297.  The pond in dispute was Loon Pond, a Class A
water body “unusual for its relatively pristine nature.”  Id. at 1277.  The ski resort pumped water from the
Pemigewasset in order to “pressurize and prevent freezing in its snowmaking equipment, and then
discharge[d] the used water into Loon Pond.”  Id. at 1296.
107. Id. at 1297.
108. Id.
109. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th
Cir. 2002).  The basin (C-11 Basin) and the water conservation area (WCA-3A) were both once part of the
Everglades.  Id. at 1366.  In the early 1900’s, the Army Corps of Engineers constructed the C-11 Canal in
order to drain the portion of Broward County constituting the C-11 Basin.  Id.  In the 1950’s, the Corps
built several levees, created WCA-3A, and completed the S-9 pump station.  Id.   Today, the C-11 Canal
collects water run-off from the C-11 Basin and seepage from the WCA-3A levees and pumps the collected
water through the S-9 pumps station into WCA-3A.  Id.
110. Id. at 1369 n.8.
conjecture, observing that “[s]ection 101(g) was not intended to take precedence over
‘legitimate and necessary water quality considerations.’”102
Examining section 304(f)(2)(F), the Consumers Power court agreed with Gorsuch
that that section did not clearly indicate a congressional intent to exempt section 304(f)
activities from NPDES requirements.103  At the same time, the court noted that “it does
not . . . necessarily indicate that dam-caused pollution would be subject to § 402 permit
requirements.”104  Having determined that section 304(f)(2)(F) did not “necessarily”
subject dams to or exclude them from the CWA, the court simply read the ambiguity
in section 304(f) as favoring an interpretation that “water quality changes caused by
the existence of dams and other similar structures were intended by Congress to be
regulated under the ‘nonpoint source’ category of pollution.”105 
Beginning the line of “pumping cases,” Dubois involved a ski resort that pumped
water from a polluted river into a pristine pond that the resort used for snowmaking
activities.106  In concluding that the pumping resulted in an “addition” of a pollutant to
a navigable water, the court emphasized that the river and the pond were distinct
bodies of water such that “the transfer of water or its contents from the [river to the
pond] would not occur naturally.”107  According to the court, to conclude otherwise and
exempt water transfers from NPDES requirements, regardless of the pollution in the
river or pond, would lead to an “irrational result.”108
Following a similar line of reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit in Miccosukee
determined that the pumping of polluted water from a drained basin over levees and
into a water conservation area was an “addition” because “the pollutants [from the
basin] would not have entered the [water conservation area] but for the change in flow
caused by” the pumping.109  Although the court noted that the basin and water
conservation area were at one time hydrologically connected, it nevertheless concluded
that the levees separating the basin and the water conservation area “made the two
bodies of water two separate and distinct bodies of water.”110  
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111. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 112 (2004) (“We find that
further development of the record is necessary to resolve the dispute over the validity of the distinction
between C-11 and WCA-3.”).
112. Id. at 104.  Had the Supreme Court not spoken in dicta, and instead held definitively that an
“addition” occurs when polluted water is transferred between two water bodies, the EPA’s subsequent rule
would be not only a form of nonacquiescence, it would be a form of contempt.
113. Id. at 109-12.  The only caselaw cited by the Court in discussing the application of “agreed-upon
law to disputed facts” was Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d 481
(2d Cir. 2001).  Id.  As discussed below, the Catskill decisions followed Dubois in concluding that the
movement of polluted water from one distinct water body into another distinct water body is an “addition”
subject to NPDES permitting requirements.  See discussion infra Part IV.B.
114. Miccosukee, 541 U.S. at 104.
115. Id. at 105-06.  The Court left the “unitary waters” argument open because the EPA had never
embodied the theory in an administrative document and “neither the District nor the Government [had]
raised the unitary waters approach before the Court of Appeals or in their briefs respecting the petition for
certiorari.”  Id. at 109.
116. Id. at 106.
117. Id.
118. Id.
In its review of Miccosukee, the Supreme Court did not disagree with the Eleventh
Circuit’s rationale but remanded the case, holding specifically that the record was
insufficient to determine whether the basin and the water conservation area were
“meaningfully distinct water bodies.”111  However, the Court’s discussion included
unusually strong dicta indicating that the resolution of the dispute “involves the
application of agreed-upon law to disputed facts.”112  More important, the agreed-upon
law discussed by the Court arguably confirmed that the proper paradigm for
determining whether the movement of water between water bodies is an “addition”
focuses exclusively on the extent to which the water bodies are distinct.113
C.  The EPA’s Proposed Water Transfer Rule—“A Delicate Balance”
Despite references to agreed-upon law, the Court in Miccosukee declined “to
resolve all . . . the legal disagreements.”114  In particular, the Court left unresolved a
“unitary waters” theory advanced by the EPA in an amicus brief positing that “all the
water bodies that fall within the Act’s definition of ‘navigable waters’ . . . should be
viewed unitarily for purposes of NPDES permitting requirements.”115  The EPA argued
that because the word “any” does not precede the phrase “navigable waters” in section
502(12), Congress intended that “NPDES permits would not be required for pollution
caused by the engineered transfer of one ‘navigable water’ into another.”116  Rather, the
EPA asserted that “Congress intended that such pollution instead would be addressed
through local nonpoint source pollution programs” as indicated in section
304(f)(2)(F).117
Expressing strong reservations about the theory’s legal underpinnings, the Court
observed initially that section 304(f)(2)(F) “does not explicitly exempt nonpoint
pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also fall within the ‘point source’
definition.”118  Furthermore, the Court pointed to other provisions in the CWA that
suggested that the CWA “protects individual water bodies as well as the ‘waters of the
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119. Id. at 107.  The Court pointed primarily to the provisions regarding water quality limited water
bodies, found in sections 303(c)(2)(A) and 303(d).  Id.
120. Id. at 108.
121. Id. at 112.
122. KLEE & GRUMBLES, supra note 7.
123. Id. at 1.  The EPA’s interpretation does not shed any light on why the agency has chosen not to
pursue its “unitary waters” theory.
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 3.




129. Id. at 32,887-88.  Entities mentioned in the public water supply category include those “operating
water treatment plants and/or operating water supply systems . . . [that] include pumping stations,
aqueducts, and/or distribution mains.”  Id. at 32,888.  Entities mentioned in the resource management
category include “state departments of fish and wildlife, state departments of pesticide regulation, state
environmental agencies, and universities.”  Id.  
130. Id. at 32,889 (quoting United States v. Boisdore’s Heirs, 49 U.S. (1 How.) 113, 122 (1850)). 
United States’ as a whole.”119  Finally, responding to a concern that subjecting
“engineered transfers among various natural water bodies” to NPDES permitting
requirements would violate state authority over water allocations protected by section
101(g), the Court concluded that “it may be that such permitting authority is necessary
to protect water quality.”120
 Although the Court appeared skeptical of the EPA’s theory, it nevertheless
indicated that the “‘unitary waters’ argument [was] open to the District on remand.”121
Perhaps perceiving a window of opportunity to articulate its position in a regulatory
form, the EPA issued an agency interpretation in August 2005 that addressed the scope
of the section 402 NPDES program.122  However, rather than fleshing out its “unitary
waters” theory, the EPA’s interpretive letter posed the question of whether the NPDES
program “is applicable to water control facilities that merely convey or connect
navigable waters.”123  Noting that the issue “touches on the delicate balance created in
the [CWA] between protection of water quality to meet federal water quality goals, and
the management of water quantity left by Congress in the hands of States,”124 the
EPA’s interpretation concluded that Congress did not intend water transfers to be
subject to permit requirements under section 402.125  On June 7, 2006, the EPA
initiated a rulemaking to formalize its conclusions as regulatory law.126
The EPA’s proposed water transfer rule seeks “to expressly exclude water
transfers from regulation under the [NPDES] permitting program.”127  Under the rule,
water transfers are defined as “an activity that conveys waters of the United States to
another water of the United States without subjecting the water to intervening
industrial, municipal, or commercial use.”128  The rule therefore applies to any entity
“involved in the transfer of waters of the United States,” and specifically includes
resource management and public water supply entities.129
The rationale for the EPA’s proposed rule rests on several grounds.  First, the EPA
asserts that the CWA should be viewed holistically and with an eye toward “the
provisions of the whole law, and its object and policy.”130  This is particularly
important, according to the EPA, because “the heart of this matter is the balance
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131. Id.
132. Id. at 32,890.
133. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000)).
134. Id.
135. Id.  The EPA, however, does not explain why a congressional understanding that water movement
could contribute to pollution necessarily indicates an intent that such pollution would be managed by states
rather than the NPDES program.
136. Id. at 32,891.  The EPA claims that water transfers are different from “effluent” released by
industrial, commercial, and municipal operations, because “[r]ather than discharge effluent, water transfers
release one water of the U.S. into another.”  Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 109 (1972)).
140. Id.
Congress created between federal and State oversight of activities affecting the nation’s
waters.”131
Reading the CWA holistically, the EPA claims a second ground for the rule’s
rationale comes from the Act’s statutory language and structure.  Observing that
“[w]hile no one provision of the Act expressly addresses whether water transfers are
subject to the NPDES program,”132 the EPA notes that section 101(b) provides that
“States have primary responsibilities with respect to the ‘development and use . . . of
land and water resources.’”133  The EPA also relies on the mandate within section
101(g), which “establishes Congress’ general direction against unnecessary Federal
interference with State allocations of water rights.”134  Finally, the EPA points to
section 304(f) and notes that although the activities mentioned in that section are not
exclusively nonpoint source in nature, section 304(f) nevertheless “reflects an
understanding by Congress that water movement could result in pollution, and that
such pollution would be managed by States under their nonpoint source program[s].”135
Reading these statutory provisions in light of the CWA’s overall structure, which is to
regulate “effluent from an industrial, commercial or municipal operation,”136 the EPA
concludes that “taken as a whole, the statutory language and structure of the [CWA]
indicate that Congress did not generally intend to subject water transfers to the NPDES
program.”137
The EPA finds a third ground for the rule’s rationale in the CWA’s legislative
history.  Most important, the EPA observes that the legislative history “discusses water
flow management activities only in the context of the nonpoint source program,”138 and
that, in discussing section 304(f), Congress “specifically mentioned water flow
management as an area where EPA would provide technical guidance to States for their
nonpoint source programs, rather than an area to be regulated under section 402.”139
Thus, the EPA concludes that Congress recognized that the NPDES program “was not
the only viable approach for addressing water quality issues associated with State water
resource management.”140
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141. New York City Department of Environmental Protection, NYC Water Supply Watersheds History,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/watershed-protection/html/history.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).  Currently,
New York City draws water from three reservoir systems, consisting of the Croton, Catskill, and Delaware
Systems.  Id.  The City developed the Croton Reservoir System first and built the City’s first aqueduct, the
Old Croton Aqueduct, in 1842.  Id.  A second aqueduct, the New Croton Aqueduct, was completed in 1890.
Id.  
In 1905, the New York State Legislature established the New York City Board of Water Supply,
which immediately began plans to tap into watersheds in the Catskill Mountains.  Id.  During the first phase
of development of the Catskill Reservoir System, from 1907 to 1915, the City dammed Esopus Creek,
constructed the Ashokan Reservoir, and built the ninety-two-mile long Catskill Aqueduct in order to deliver
the Ashokan Reservoir’s water to the City.  The Catskill Watershed Corporation, Watershed History,
http://www.cwconline.org/about/ab_hist1.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007).  During the second phase of
development, from 1919 to 1927, the City turned north to a new watershed and constructed the Schoharie
Reservoir by damming Schoharie Creek.  Id.  As part of the Schoharie Reservoir construction, the City built
the eighteen-mile long Shandaken Tunnel, which drains water from Schoharie Reservoir into Esopus Creek
and ultimately into the Ashokan Reservoir.  Id.  
Finally, in 1931, the City began constructing the Delaware Reservoir System after the Supreme
Court denied an injunction sought by New Jersey to prohibit the City from drawing water from the
Delaware River.  New York City Department of Environmental Protection, supra (referencing New Jersey
v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931)).  Water from the Delaware System, which now provides fifty percent
of the City’s drinking water, began flowing to the City in 1944 with the completion of the Delaware
Aqueduct.  Id.  Today, the New York City Water Supply System draws water from the world’s largest
unfiltered surface water supply: a total watershed covering 1,969 square miles, consisting of nineteen
individual reservoirs with a storage capacity of 580 billion gallons, and capable of delivering 1.3 billion
gallons of water every day to the City and nearby counties.  Id.  
For an interesting account of how geographical factors influenced the construction of the City’s
water supply system, see Anastasia von Burkalow, The Geography of New York City’s Water Supply: A
Study of Interactions, 49 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 369 (1959).  For a fascinating documentary on the Catskill
water system and the communities that were flooded in order to build it, see DEEP WATER: BUILDING THE
CATSKILL WATER SYSTEM (Willow Mixed Media 2001).




146. Catskill II, 451 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2006).
IV.  THE CATSKILL DECISIONS
A.  Factual Background
New York City (the City) has obtained a portion of its drinking water from the
Schoharie Dam and Reservoir in the Catskill Mountains since before World War II.141
Under natural conditions, water from the Schoharie Reservoir would flow north
through the Schoharie Creek and into the Hudson River.142  However, to deliver water
from the Schoharie Reservoir to the City, the City conveys the water eighteen miles
south through the Shandaken Tunnel where it blends with the water of Esopus Creek.143
After flowing through Esopus Creek, the blended waters eventually pool into the
Ashokan Reservoir before flowing ninety-two miles south to the City through the
Catskill Aqueduct.144  Without the transfer facilitated by the Shandaken Tunnel, the
waters of Schoharie Creek and Esopus Creek would remain hydrologically separated,
although each watershed is a natural tributary of the Hudson River.145  
Water in the Schoharie Reservoir contains both natural and man-made suspended
solids and is naturally more turbid than the water of Esopus Creek.146  When these





151. The environmental groups constituting the plaintiffs included Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout
Unlimited, Inc., Theodore Gordon Flyfishers, Inc., Catskill-Delaware Natural Water Alliance, Inc.,
Federated Sportsmen’s Clubs of Ulster County, Inc., and Riverkeeper, Inc..  Catskill I, 273 F.3d 481, 484
(2d Cir. 2001).
152. Id. at 484-85.




157. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 6, Catskill I, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001) (No. 00-9447), 2001 WL
34113732.
158. Id. at 10.
suspended solids are discharged into Esopus Creek via the Shandaken Tunnel, the
resultant increase in turbidity interferes with recreational uses of the creek, primarily
fly fishing.147  Historically, the New York Department of Environmental Conservation
(NYDEC), which administers the CWA in New York State, has not used the CWA
permitting scheme to regulate turbidity in the Shandaken Tunnel.148  Instead, the City
has tried to tackle the turbidity problem by studying ways to mitigate turbid discharges
from the tunnel.149  Prior to the Catskill litigation, however, the City had failed to
develop an adequate remedy.150  
B.  Catskill I
In March 2000, Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited and other
environmental groups151 (collectively, Catskill) filed suit in district court claiming that
the City’s operation of the Schoharie Reservoir and Shandaken Tunnel violated section
301(a) of the CWA, which prohibits the discharge of a pollutant in the absence of a
discharge permit.152  Catskill alleged that the Shandaken Tunnel discharges a variety
of pollutants into Esopus Creek, including suspended solids, turbidity, and heat, and
that the resulting turbidity and temperature of Esopus Creek violated state water quality
standards and endangered “one of the premier trout fishing streams in the Catskill
Region.”153
 In its response to the Catskill complaint, the City argued that it did not need a
permit because the discharges from the Shandaken Tunnel did “not effect an ‘addition’
of a pollutant, as required to constitute a ‘discharge’ for which a permit must be
sought.”154  The district court agreed with the City and granted its motion to dismiss,
deciding as a matter of law that water from the Shandaken Tunnel was not an
“addition” of a pollutant to Esopus Creek that necessitated a permit under the CWA.155
Catskill appealed the district court’s decision.156 
On appeal before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Catskill contended that the
district court had erred in holding that Catskill’s complaint “did not properly plead the
existence of the ‘addition’ element.”157  Based on the policy, goals, and legislative
history of the CWA, Catskill argued that it is “clear that the [CWA] intended to cover
any discharge that interferes with the natural integrity of the nation's waters.”158
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Specifically, Catskill argued that the “integrity” of which the CWA spoke prohibited
the addition of pollutants resulting from water transfers between two separate water
bodies belonging to two separate watersheds.159  According to Catskill, the City’s
definition of “addition” led to the anomalous result where “trucking floating garbage
from the most polluted urban backwater and dumping it into a mountain trout stream”
would not be prohibited “on the theory that the garbage was already in waters of the
United States somewhere, and therefore it was not an ‘addition’ of pollutants to the
trout stream.”160  
Catskill supported its argument by claiming that the water transfer at issue in
Dubois is indistinguishable from the Shandaken Tunnel water transfer.161  Catskill
emphasized that the court in Dubois held that “the transfer of pollutants between . . .
two distinct water bodies would constitute an ‘addition’ of a pollutant.”162  Similarly,
Catskill argued that Schoharie Reservoir and Esopus Creek are “two distinct bodies of
water . . . existing in two distinct watersheds,” and that the “discharge of pollutants
from the Shandaken Tunnel into the Esopus Creek is clearly an ‘addition’ under the
meaning of the Clean Water Act.”163  
The City rejected Catskill’s assertion that an “addition” occurs when water is
diverted from one water body to another.164  Rather, the City argued that the transfer
of water from Schoharie Reservoir into Esopus Creek was indistinguishable from cases
involving dam-induced water quality changes, which the courts in Gorsuch and
Consumers Power  found to be outside the permitting requirements of the CWA.165
The City argued that, according to Gorsuch and Consumers Power, an “addition”
occurs only when a pollutant is physically introduced “into the water from the outside
world.”166  In particular, the City asserted that the “key inquiry for purposes of
‘addition’ is whether the defendant has him/her/itself introduced anything to the
waters.”167  Thus, the City argued that because “the City does not ‘do’ anything to the
water it diverts to the Esopus Creek,”168 the Catskill complaint “failed to allege facts
establishing the element of ‘addition.’”169  
Additionally, the City indicated that Gorsuch “emphasized that there is ‘specific
indication in the [CWA] that Congress did not want to interfere any more than
necessary with state water management, of which dams are an important
component.’”170  Equating the dam in Gorsuch to the Shandaken Tunnel, the City
claimed that the tunnel’s water transfer was “part of a public water supply system . . .
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178. Id. at 493 (citing Dubois v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-97 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
179. Id. at 493-94.  In particular, the City had relied on section 101(g), id., which states that “[i]t is the
policy of Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall
not be superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this [Act].”  33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).  The court
noted that the policy goal articulated in section 101(g) is only one of many listed in the Act, which also
includes section 101(a)’s objective of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 494 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).  
180. Catskill I, 273 F.3d at 494.
181. Id.
which specifically has been authorized by the State.”171  Furthermore, the City argued
that New York State was already addressing turbidity problems in the Shandaken
Tunnel as required by State regulations.172
The Second Circuit ruled in favor of Catskill, holding that an “addition” to a water
body occurs when pollutants are introduced “from the outside world,” which “is
construed as any place outside the particular water body to which pollutants are
introduced.”173  Central to the court’s reasoning was its distinction between intrabasin
and interbasin water transfers.174  Using a soup ladle analogy, the court characterized
Gorsuch and Consumers Power as intrabasin transfers that effectively ladled soup from
a pot, lifted it above the pot, and poured it back in without “‘add[ing]’ soup or anything
else to the pot.”175  However, the court determined that an interbasin transfer, such as
the Shandaken Tunnel, “strains past the breaking point the assumption of ‘sameness’
made by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts.”176  The court viewed interbasin
transfers as equivalent to transferring soup from one pot to another pot such that “an
‘addition’ of a ‘pollutant’ from a ‘point source’ has been made to a ‘navigable
water.’”177  Thus, the court’s holding was a rejection of the “singular entity” theory of
navigable waters, which assumed that an “addition to one water body is deemed an
addition to all of the waters of the United States.”178  
Finally, the court also rejected the City’s argument that the provisions of the CWA
reserving the power to the states to allocate water resources superseded the explicit
permit requirements mandated by the CWA under section 301(a).179  Observing that
the CWA “balances a welter of consistent and inconsistent goals,” the court concluded
that “none of the statute’s broad purposes sways us from what we find to be the plain
meaning of its text.”180  The court reversed the judgment dismissing the case and
remanded it to the district court.181
C.  Catskill II
On remand, the district court granted Catskill’s motion for summary judgment and
later assessed civil penalties against the City for failing to obtain a NPDES permit
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“no less significant than those resulting from inter-basin transfers.”  Id.  Arguing that the factual record in
Catskill I did not highlight the water quality changes resulting from dam impoundments, the City claimed
that the soup ladle analogy in Catskill I was inapt and the new factual record developed on remand
“supports this Court's reconsideration of the soup ladle analogy.”  Id. at 26.
189. Id. at 29.  Section 502(12) defines the discharge of a pollutant as “any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source.”  33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).  The City asserted that the absence
of the word “any” before the term “navigable waters” embodied Congress’ intent not to distinguish one
water body from another.  Brief of Defendants-Third-Party-Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees, supra
note 186, at 29.  The City also asserted that the plural use of “waters” indicated Congress’ intent to treat
“navigable waters as a whole.”  Id.
190. Id. at 31.
within a reasonable time.182  The City appealed the decision and returned to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming the assessed penalty was exorbitant and asking the
court to reconsider its holding in Catskill I.183  The court stated that it would “recon-
sider our holding in Catskill I if there are cogent, compelling reasons . . . such as a
change in controlling law.”184  The court then noted that two such intervening legal
developments had occurred since the decision in Catskill I: first, the Supreme Court
had issued its decision in Miccosukee, and second, the EPA had issued an agency
interpretation explaining the applicability of NPDES permits to water transfers.185
Beginning its argument, the City claimed that Miccosukee held that intrabasin
transfers do not trigger NPDES permitting requirements and that there is no reasoned
basis for viewing interbasin transfers differently.186  First, the City noted that the Court
in Miccosukee “did not decide whether there is a distinction between inter- and intra-
basin transfers” and instead “left the question open” to be addressed in the “context of the
‘unitary waters’ approach.”187  Second, the City asserted that there is “no scientific basis
for a distinction between inter- and intra-basin transfers” and that as a result “Congress
did not write one into the [CWA].”188  Third, offering an embellished version of the
“unitary waters” theory discredited by the court in Catskill I, the City argued that the
language of section 502(12), which provides the definition for a pollutant discharge,
“signals Congress’ understanding that NPDES permits would not be required for
pollution caused by the engineered transfer of one ‘navigable water’ into another.”189 
Furthermore, the City asserted that sections 101(g) and 510 reserve to the states
the power to manage water transfers for water supply purposes and that NPDES permit
requirements would improperly “restrict the City’s use of the Shandaken Tunnel.”190
According to the City, Miccosukee’s proposal to resolve possible violations of section
101(g) resulting from NPDES oversight of water transfers through the issuance of
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there was no reasonable method to ensure that discharges from the Shandaken Tunnel “consistently achieve
the State water quality standard for turbidity,” the effluent limitations in general permits requiring
compliance with water quality standards presented the same practical problems as those in an individual
NPDES permit.  Id. at 33-34. Finally, the City also pointed out that Miccosukee’s discussion of the
availability of general permits was “a concept . . . that had not been developed in the record in Miccosukee,”
and therefore did not “reflect a full factual analysis.”  Id. at 34.  
192. Id. at 36.
193. Id. at 38-39.  The City explained that it was already operating the Catskill water supply system
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sources.”  Id. at 40.  The City also indicated that discharges from the Shandaken Tunnel must comply with
New York State water quality standards and that violations are already “subject to enforcement by the
Commissioner of the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation.”  Id. at 44 (citing N.Y.
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-0313(2), 17-0501 (West, Westlaw through 2007 legislation Ch. 1-678); N.Y.
COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 6, Parts 700-704 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 2007)).
194. Id. at 43.
195. Catskill II, 451 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2006).
196. Id. at 83.
197. Id. (quoting S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95, 110 (2004)).
198. Id. at 82-83.
199. Id. at 82.
200. Id. at 82-83.  The court essentially concluded that the City’s “new evidence” was not “new” at all
because “it simply show[ed] that the release of water from a dam into downstream water is no less likely
to add pollutants as would a transfer of water from a distinct water body”; the court emphasized that it was
general permits presented an entirely inadequate remedy.191   Arguing from the CWA’s
affirmation of the “traditional powers of states over water allocation,”192 the City con-
cluded that the regulation of the Shandaken Tunnel should be left to state and federal laws
and regulations other than the CWA.193  Finally, the City pointed to section 304(f)(2)(F),
which discusses “flow diversion facilities” in the context of non-point sources of
pollution, as a clear indication that the CWA treats “changes in the flow of water
differently from point sources of pollutants” subject to NPDES permit requirements.194
After summarizing the salient points of its decision in Catskill I, the court
proceeded to dispense with the City’s claims for reconsideration, describing them as
“warmed-up arguments” that the court had previously rejected.195  Contrary to the
City’s contention that Miccosukee did not distinguish between intrabasin and interbasin
water transfers, the court noted that Miccosukee made express reference to the “soup
ladle” analogy from Catskill I and drew a clear distinction between the two types of
transfers.196  Indeed, the Supreme Court had remanded the case specifically to deter-
mine whether the waters in dispute were essentially “‘two pots of soup, not one.’”197
The court also refuted the City’s contention that “new evidence” suggested no
scientific basis for distinguishing intrabasin and interbasin transfers.198  Responding to
the City’s argument that intrabasin transfers of water are “no less likely to add
pollutants”199 than interbasin transfers, the court noted that it had previously considered
“the presence of pollutants in intrabasin transfers” when it reviewed Gorsuch and
Consumers Power in the context of Catskill I.200  The court emphasized that the key
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water bodies that have failed to achieve NPDES-mandated water quality standards.  Miccosukee, 541 U.S.
at 105-09.  The Court in Miccosukee suggested that these provisions “suggest[] that the [CWA] protects
individual water bodies as well as the ‘waters of the United States’ as a whole.”  Id. at 107.
204. Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 83.
205. Id.  The City relied on the 2005 EPA interpretation that insisted that a water transfer between two
navigable waters should not be looked at through the narrow prism of an “addition.” Rather, the EPA urged
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more appropriate.  Id. at 82.  See also KLEE & GRUMBLES, supra note 7, at 5.  
206. Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 84.
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208. 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
209. Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 84 (quoting PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 720).
point was not that pollutants are present in both intrabasin and interbasin transfers, but
that only interbasin transfers “‘add’ pollutants to the navigable waters” and thus trigger
NPDES permitting requirements.201
Next, the court turned its attention to the City’s renewed “unitary waters” theory
and found that Miccosukee confirmed its previous rejection of the theory in Catskill
I.202  The court pointed particularly to Miccosukee’s reference to several provisions of
the CWA that distinguish the navigable waters of the United States, “implying that, at
least in the context of the CWA, the unitary-water theory has no place.”203  Given that
Miccosukee did nothing more than “note the existence of the theory and raise possible
arguments against it,” the court concluded that Miccosukee did not represent a change
in the law that warranted reconsideration of Catskill I.204
Turning to the City’s final argument, the court dismissed the contention that a
“holistic” reading of the CWA, and in particular sections 101(g), 510, and 304(f),
required a reconsideration of Catskill I.205  Considering the CWA provisions relating
to state rights in water allocations, the court observed that the “power of the states to
allocate quantities of water within their borders is not inconsistent with federal
regulation of water quality.”206  Specifically, the court reasoned that section 510 only
preserves state rights “not in conflict with the other requirements of the CWA,”
suggesting Congress did not intend for the NPDES program to be superseded by state
water allocation programs.207  Support for the court’s reasoning came from PUD No. 1
v. Washington Department of Ecology,208 in which the Supreme Court explained that
“[s]ections 101(g) and 510(2) preserve the authority of each State to allocate water
quantity as between users; they do not limit the scope of water pollution controls.”209
Although Miccosukee raised the concern that federal NPDES requirements may at
times violate state authority under section 101(g) and prohibitively raise costs on
projects such as the Shandaken Tunnel, the court pointed out that Miccosukee also
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MANUAL 69 (1996)).
recognized that “such permits nevertheless might be necessary to protect water
quality.”210
The court also found the City’s section 304(f)(2)(F) argument unavailing because
that section’s reference to “flow diversion facilities” in the context of non-point
sources of pollution did not clearly indicate that “changes in the circulation of
navigable waters . . . [should] be exempt from the permit requirements that apply to
point sources.”211  The court supported its reasoning by pointing to Miccosukee, in
which the Supreme Court explained that section 304(f)(2)(F) “does not explicitly
exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also fall with the
‘point source’ definition.”212  Using a similar line of reasoning to dismiss the City’s
claim that programs other than the CWA are more appropriate for regulating the
Shandaken Tunnel, the court explained that “the City does not explain how their
existence invalidates a separate, independent requirement imposed by the permitting
scheme of the CWA.”213  
In conclusion, the court stated that the City’s “‘holistic’ arguments about the
allocation of state and federal rights . . . simply overlook [the CWA’s] plain
language.”214  The critical question for the court was the significance of the word
“addition,” the meaning of which had not changed since Catskill II, “despite the City’s
attempts to shift attention away from the text of the CWA to its context.”215  Noting
that the CWA attempts to strike a balance between state water allocation rights and
uniform standards designed to protect the nation’s waters, the court criticized the City
and the EPA for trying to “tip the balance toward the allocation goals.”216  Because the
court believed the CWA already provided enough flexibility to accommodate both
federal regulation of water quality and state regulation of water quantity allocation, the
court declared it would “adhere to the balance that Congress has struck and remains
free to change.”217 
V.  ANALYSIS
Contrary to the Catskill decision and the precedent upon which it was based, the
EPA’s proposed rule seeks to “expressly exclude” from section 402 NPDES regulation
any “activity that conveys waters of the United States to another water of the United
States,” provided the water is not subjected to “intervening industrial, municipal, or
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exempt from CWA regulation water transfers between distinct water bodies.  However, the “unitary waters”
theory and the EPA rule rely on different definition-based rationales.  The “unitary waters” theory exempts
water transfers by defining the waters of the U.S. as one singular water body, thereby eliminating the need
to distinguish between interbasin and intrabasin water transfers.  The EPA’s proposed rule changes the
definitional focus and simply defines water transfers as categorically exempt from the CWA, regardless of
whether the transfer is an interbasin or intrabasin transfer.
commercial use.”218  In two ways in particular, the proposed rule contradicts caselaw:
first, it refuses to acquiesce in several courts’ understanding of the meaning and
importance of “addition” as used in section 502(12); second, it rejects the considered
judgments of several courts regarding the proper balance of state and federal interests
under the Act.  Ultimately, as this Note concludes, the EPA’s nonacquiescence is
harmful not only to the administration of the CWA, but to the integrity of the Act itself.
A.  The EPA’s Nonacquiescence to the Meaning of “Addition”
Under the EPA’s proposed rule, water transfers between different water bodies are
acceptable regardless of the pollution levels in each water body.  The rule therefore
exempts from section 402 NPDES regulation the very event that the Catskill court
found unacceptable: a transfer from one polluted water body to another pristine water
body.  The effect of the rule is to reject any distinction between interbasin and
intrabasin water transfers, which the Catskill court, echoed by Dubois and Miccosukee,
found to be critical to the meaning of “addition.”219  
In Miccosukee, for example, the water transfer between the two disputed water
bodies did not add any pollutant that was not already present.  Indeed, the Court firmly
established that a point source facilitating a transfer does not need to add a pollutant
in order to trigger the CWA.   Rather, the Court found that a point source “need only
convey the pollutant to ‘navigable waters,’”220 concluding that whether an “addition”
of a pollutant had occurred hinged on whether the two water bodies were
“meaningfully distinct water bodies.”221  Similarly, in the Catskill decisions, the court
concluded that interbasin transfers merited special attention under the CWA because,
unlike intrabasin transfers, they “‘add’ pollutants to the navigable waters” and thus
satisfy the “addition” element, triggering NPDES permitting requirements.222   
The EPA’s rule, on the other hand, gives effect to the term “addition” only to the
extent that “intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use[s]” add pollutants
during a water transfer.223  By excluding water transfers from regulation except when
the transfer itself adds pollutants, the rule obviates any need to distinguish between
interbasin and intrabasin transfers.  In fact, the EPA’s rule essentially achieves the
exact ends as the agency’s “unitary waters” theory,224 a theory the Catskill court called
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228. 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977).  
229. Id. at 1372, 1379.  In particular, the EPA had identified the need to regulate uncontaminated storm
water discharge as a source of severe administrative burden.  Id.
230. Id. at 1377.
231. KLEE & GRUMBLES, supra note 7, at 2.
232. Catskill II, 451 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2006).
“absurd,”225 the Miccosukee Court suggested would “conflict with current NPDES
regulations,”226 and that numerous commentators have questioned.227
Furthermore, the EPA’s rule creates a categorical exemption from the CWA for
water transfers that is at odds with the interpretation of the Act given by most courts.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle,228 for example, the court struck
down an EPA regulation that exempted several classes of point sources because of
“administrative infeasibility.”229  The court held, based on the CWA’s language and
legislative history, that the EPA did not have the authority to create categorical
exemptions to CWA regulation.230  Therefore, to the extent that the EPA’s rule exempts
an entire activity from the CWA’s section 402 NPDES regulations, the EPA’s rule is
in direct conflict with prior precedent.
B.  The EPA’s Nonacquiescence to the Clean Water Act’s 
Balance of Cooperative Federalism
The EPA’s proposed rule seeks to exempt water transfers from CWA requirements
based on “the delicate balance created in the statute between protection of water
quality to meet federal water quality goals, and the management of water quantity left
by Congress in the hands of States.”231  According to the EPA’s “delicate balance,” at
least in the context of water transfers, federal protection of water quality and State
management of water quantity are mutually exclusive categories; once water transfers
are defined as belonging to State water allocation schemes, they are categorically
removed from the NPDES program and the federal interest in protecting water quality.
More than “tip[ping] the balance toward the allocation goals,”232 as the Catskill court
described, the EPA’s rule simply removes the federal interest in protecting water
quality from the scale.
As the Catskill court and Miccosukee Court both emphasized, state interests in
managing water allocation and federal interests in protecting water quality are not only
expressly provided for in the CWA, but are intended to exist harmoniously within the
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water within their borders is not inconsistent with federal regulation of water quality.”  Catskill II, 451 F.3d
at 84.
234. Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 84 (quoting PUD No. 1 v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 720
(1994)).
235. NPDES Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,890 (proposed June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 40
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Act’s cooperative federalism structure.233  The Catskill court, in particular, highlighted
the interaction between state and federal interests by referencing the Supreme Court’s
determination that “‘[s]ections 101(g) and 510(2) preserve the authority of each State
to allocate water quantity as between users; they do not limit the scope of water
pollution controls.’”234  According to Catskill, although a state may claim that a water
transfer falls entirely under its authority to manage water allocation quantities, by no
means does that claim extinguish the federal interest in protecting water quality
through the NPDES program.  The EPA’s proposed rule, however, rejects Catskill’s
formulation of the CWA’s cooperative federalism and states that, because of sections
101(g) and 510, “it is reasonable to read the statute as not requiring NPDES permits
for water transfers.”235
Similarly, the EPA’s reliance on section 304(f)(2)(F) is at odds with Catskill and
Miccosukee.  Because section 304(f)(2)(F) directs the EPA to issue guidelines for
controlling nonpoint pollution from “changes in the movement, flow or circulation of
any navigable waters . . . caused by . . . flow diversion facilities,”236 the EPA concludes
that Congress was aware “that water movement could result in pollution, and that such
pollution would be managed by states under their nonpoint source program authorities,
rather than the NPDES program.”237  However, as the Miccosukee Court noted, section
304(f) “does not explicitly exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES
program if they also fall within the ‘point source’ definition.”238  Because the “dams,
levees, channels, causeways, [and] flow diversion facilities” mentioned in section
304(f)(2)(F) are likely to qualify as point sources as defined in section 502(14),
Miccosukee seems to suggest that these facilities can never be wholly exempt from the
NPDES program.  
Indeed, the most natural reading of section 304(f)(2)(F) suggests that it is an
additional regulatory procedure beyond the NPDES program, not an alternate
regulatory procedure that exempts the facilities mentioned in section 304(f) from the
NPDES requirements.  In essence, section 304(f) simply states that to the extent that
“flow diversion facilities” contribute to nonpoint pollution, the EPA should issue
guidelines that identify and evaluate “processes, procedures, and methods to control”
such pollution.  Nowhere in the language of section 304(f) is there an indication that,
by virtue of its contribution to nonpoint pollution, a “flow diversion facility” that also
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qualifies as a point source should be exempt from NPDES regulations aimed at
controlling pollution from point sources.
C.  The Effect of the EPA’s Nonacquiescence on the 
Clean Water Act and its Administration
Assuming that the main benefits of intercircuit and intracircuit nonacquiescence
are increased regulatory uniformity and circuit dialogue, the EPA’s nonacquiescence
is justified only if these benefits outweigh the harms to the administration of the CWA
and the integrity of the CWA itself.  However, the EPA’s nonacquiescence does not
contribute to either regulatory uniformity or circuit dialogue.  In fact, the EPA’s rule
creates greater regulatory disunity and disturbs “agreed-upon law” generated by several
circuits.  As a result, the EPA’s rule only creates administrative confusion and dilutes
the integrity of the CWA. 
Unlike many regulations that are issued in the absence of judicial commentary, the
EPA’s proposed water transfer rule is unique because the rationale of the rule has
already been discussed, developed and criticized in several court decisions.  In essence,
the EPA is consciously choosing to promulgate a rule that the agency knows is in
conflict with several circuits.  The EPA is thus in a very different position from an
agency that promulgates a rule on a clean slate and then chooses not to acquiesce to
subsequent adverse court decisions in the interests of maintaining regulatory uniformity
and generating circuit dialogue.  Here, the EPA is not seeking to maintain regulatory
uniformity or generate circuit dialogue.  Rather, the EPA is seeking to create a new
regulatory regime and simply ignoring a significant amount of caselaw developed
through circuit dialogue.   
With its water transfer rule, the EPA has proposed a regulation with national
application and significance.  Under these circumstances, the EPA has an interest in
preserving uniformity in its regulations under the CWA.239  Indeed, this need for
uniformity arguably constitutes a primary justification for the EPA’s nonacquiescence
to the Catskill and Miccosukee decisions.240  Yet the EPA’s water transfer rule does not
bring uniformity to the CWA.  Instead, the EPA’s rule merely introduces a rationale
that has been rejected by, or received negative treatment in, at least two circuits and
a Supreme Court decision.  By flying in the face of precedent, the EPA’s rule works
an immediate disunity into the CWA and, insofar as water transfers are concerned,
makes its uniform administration throughout the circuits questionable.
At one time, the General Counsel to the EPA explained that “because of a special
need to maintain uniformity in the environmental context, and a relatively responsive
Congress,” the agency has “eschew[ed] relitigation of an issue that has been squarely
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245. The court in Catskill described the EPA’s departure from the CWA’s ideals by “point[ing] out that
complex statutes often have seemingly inconsistent goals that must be balanced . . . .  The CWA seeks to
achieve water allocation goals as well as to restore and maintain the quality of the nation’s waters.  The City
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(2d Cir. 2006).  
246. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
247. NPDES Proposed Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 32,887, 32,887 (proposed June 7, 2006) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 122).
248. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000).
249. In Gorsuch, for example, the meaning of “addition” was critical to determine whether a pollutant
was introduced “into [the] water from the outside world.”  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156,
175 (D.C. Cir. 1982).  Similarly, in Catskill, the court concluded that “[i]t is the meaning of the word
‘addition’ upon which the outcome of Catskill I turned and which has not changed.”  Catskill II, 451 F.3d
at 84.  Finally, in Miccosukee, the Court specifically remanded the case to determine the factual distinction
between the two disputed water bodies because the resolution was critical to whether an “addition” of a
decided against it in any circuit.”241  Although relitigation is not analogous to rule-
making, the General Counsel’s comments suggest that while the EPA could, through
rulemaking, “develop a record that would support a policy that has been rejected,”242
the EPA might better serve its regulatory interests and the interests of uniformity by
seeking Congressional review rather than ignoring circuit court decisions.
Nor is circuit dialogue—the other benefit of nonacquiescence—served by the
EPA’s proposed water transfer rule.  Proponents of nonacquiescence claim that bars
against both intercircuit and intracircuit nonacquiescence stymie dialogue within
circuits and between circuits.243  Again, however, two circuits and a Supreme Court
decision have already discussed the rationale for the EPA’s water transfer rule, and
none found it favorable.  Furthermore, in Catskill II, the EPA secured reconsideration
of Catskill I, thereby refuting the assumption that a prohibition against
nonacquiescence creates a “one-way ratchet” against agency decision-making.244  
Perhaps more fundamental than the harm to the administration of the CWA, the
EPA’s nonacquiescence represents a significant departure from the ideals of the CWA
articulated in Catskill and its prior precedent.245  As Costle established, the EPA does
not have the authority to make categorical exemptions to the CWA.246 To the extent
that the EPA rule “expressly exclude[s]”247 water transfers from the NPDES program,
the rule is a retraction from the CWA’s broad mandate to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”248  Unless provided
by statute, the CWA does not envision piecemeal application of its principles or make
them turn on the EPA’s determination of whether they are appropriate in a given
situation.  Yet, by classifying water transfers as an inappropriate regime for NPDES
regulation, the EPA has worked a piecemeal excision from the CWA.
The EPA’s water transfer rule also departs from the language of the CWA,
effectively diluting the potency of the Act’s provisions.  Courts from Gorsuch and
Consumers Power to Dubois, Catskill I and II, and Miccosukee, have reiterated the
importance of finding an “addition” to determine whether NPDES permitting require-
ments have been triggered.249  Conceptually, an “addition” of a pollutant is critical to
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the framework of the CWA’s pollution programs.  However, in exempting water
transfers from the NPDES program, the EPA’s rule trivializes the importance of an
“addition;” again, the EPA’s rule takes a piecemeal approach and disregards section
502(12)’s “any addition” language, choosing instead to define an “addition” as only
those pollutants that come from “intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial
use.”250   Nowhere in the CWA, or in the cases examining the Act, is it apparent that
the Act’s language is intended to be so malleable.
Finally, the EPA’s nonacquiescence diminishes the CWA’s vision of cooperative
federalism as interpreted in Catskill and other decisions.  As the EPA’s rule recognizes,
the CWA delicately balances “federal and State oversight of activities affecting the
nation’s waters.”251  Because complex statutes like the CWA seek to reconcile myriad
competing policies, proper balancing “is not served by elevating one policy above the
others.”252  Yet, by categorically exempting water transfers from the NPDES program,
the EPA’s proposed rule performs such an elevation.  In effect, the EPA’s rule
promotes “State regimes for allocating water rights”253 at the expense of uniform
national environmental policies that are the foundational principles of the CWA.  As
the Catskill court explained, “where the balance struck in the text is sufficiently clear
to point to an answer,”254 such an unbalanced enlargement of state interests is not
warranted, particularly where the CWA provides for the federal and state interests “to
coexist without materially impairing either.”255
VI.  CONCLUSION
Congress drafted the CWA on the basis of an ideal, and as such, the goal of
restoring and maintaining the nation’s waters is still an unrealized vision.  However,
the means provided by Congress to achieve the Act’s goals are not similarly conceived
and are instead practical and workable.  In the context of water transfers, courts have
developed a significant body of caselaw that considers the competing federal interests
in preserving water quality and State interests in managing water quantities, and have
concluded that water transfers between distinct water bodies are an “addition” that
should be subject to the NPDES program.  By ignoring these considered judgments,
the EPA’s proposed water transfer rule both obscures the language of the CWA and
disturbs the Act’s balance of cooperative federalism.  Unfortunately, rather than
bringing greater uniformity to the CWA, the EPA’s nonacquiescence brings immediate
disunity to the Act.  As a result, the rule’s “delicate balance” strikes an unsteady com-
promise and trades national environmental objectives for an increase in administrative
convenience.
